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Abstract 
 
This study proposes a critical analysis of indoctrination in the field of 
education. We shall first discuss the meaning of this word trying to identify 
two fundamental dimensions: the pedagogical dimension and the ideological 
one. After approaching the relationship between indoctrination and authority 
in education, we classify the types of indoctrination identified by O. Reboul 
(1977) based on these two dimensions. For the analysis of indoctrination in 
the teaching process we used a four-dimensional model that includes: the 
intention, teaching contents, teaching methods and finalities of the didactic 
process. The study concludes with criticisms of indoctrination in terms of the 
constructivist paradigm in education. We consider that, far from having 
achieved the single possible approach, the constructivism is an option for 
educating the critical spirit and preventing the risks of indoctrination within 
the teaching process. 
 
Keywords: indoctrination, authority, teaching, criticism of indoctrination, 
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1.  The Concept of Indoctrination. 
The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
 
The initial meaning of indoctrination is of pedagogical 
nature. In Latin, Doctrina means education, science, doctrine, 
that can many times substitute one for another. The former 
meaning of doctrine was savoir or acquired knowledge (Robert 
1957, 1564), while that of the verb to indoctrinate was: to 
instruct, to provide someone with knowledge, to teach a science 
(Robert 1957, 1564). These terms acquired other meanings that 
allowed a semantic shift to the political ideology without losing Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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their fundamental pedagogical meaning. According to Robert, 
the second meaning of doctrine is that of “a set of principles 
stated as true that aim to guide or govern people’s actions (...)” 
(1534), while the meaning of indoctrination is strictly related to 
that of pursuing: “the attempt to make somebody adhere to a 
doctrine, an opinion, a point of view” (1564). 
The general meaning of this notion mostly envisaged the 
extreme situations: “training” the young Nazis, brain washing, 
totalitarian propaganda etc. The indoctrination of children was 
one of the most efficient methods for strengthening the 
totalitarian regimes. The children taken from their families at a 
young age in order to be transformed into some objects owned 
by the state represents the major stage of an efficient 
indoctrination. Once uprooted, the child is forced to integrate 
with a conditioned behavior into a community that represses 
the developing personality (Cathala 1986). 
The English literature (White 1972, Snook 1972) defines 
the indoctrination in relation to interpersonal relationships, in 
general, and to moral values, in particular. 
The French literature (Reboul 1977, Burdeau 1985, 
1989) no longer places the indoctrination at interpersonal level, 
but at institutional level. The fact that a teacher indoctrinates 
the students is imputable but less interesting than knowing 
that the educational system, as a whole, is an institution that 
uses indoctrination, provided that the school can be considered 
as an ideological state instrument capable to develop a political 
and social system and to enlist individuals in it. In this 
situation, the indoctrination is no longer an ethical issue but 
also a political one. 
To conclude, indoctrination has a very complex and 
circumstantial meaning: its original meaning is pedagogical 
and positive; by shifting to the political ideology it acquired 
negative meanings. This term is mostly used with its negative 
meaning and envisages two fundamental dimensions: the 
pedagogical dimension and the ideological one. 
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2. The Relationship between Indoctrination and 
Authority in Education 
 
Indoctrination always involves an authority 
relationship. In education, he/she who teaches or indoctrinates 
others exercises a power considered more or less legitimate. 
Similar to teachers, he/she who indoctrinates others is the 
representative of an institution of authority; he/she asserts 
him/herself in the name of God, society, people, culture, truth, 
humankind etc. (Reboul 1977, 33).  
Not all forms of authority are related to indoctrination, 
particularly because authority is a universal phenomenon. G. 
Burdeau (1989, 578) emphasizes the universality and 
polymorphism of authority which is not found only in the 
human society. All animals live in groups and have a leader 
that represents the authority. In human communities the 
authority is a constant element of the social life.  
G. Burdeau (1989) identifies three basic forms of 
authority: the anonymous authority generated by the group 
pressures over the behavior of individuals; the personal 
authority that is spontaneous within social groups as the 
preeminence of an individual who is capable to influence the 
attitude of the others and the functional authority consisting in 
the power invested in certain persons due to the position they 
hold within a specific institutional framework. The difference 
between the latter two forms occurs in the current language 
when we distinguish between a person who has authority and a 
person who is (an) authority.  
In semiotics terms, Bocheński (1974) identifies the forms 
of authority based on the fields where it occurs. He 
distinguishes between the epistemic authority, namely the 
authority of he/she who knows (teacher, specialist), and the 
deontic authority of superiors, chiefs, commanders, leaders etc.  
The didactic authority is defined by its particular way of 
mixing various forms of authority as pure forms. In terms of 
norms, values and spiritual traditions of the society, it is an 
anonymous authority. It is the authority of the “educational 
society” and school materialized in the transfer of culture to 
younger generations. The teacher takes part in this anonymous Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
91 
 
 
authority. The teacher embodies the school authority which 
he/she converts into a functional authority: he/she is entitled 
with authority by the society and the school. The teacher is the 
person who has  authority, by which he/she demands to be 
listened, an external form of discipline. According to Bocheński, 
this is a deontic authority; the teacher claims compliance with 
imperative norms and the acceptance of the authority he/she 
was given. The real authority of a teacher is, as stated by 
Bocheński, epistemic: the authority of he/she who knows and 
provides knowledge. In authoritarian systems, the epistemic 
authority plays a significantly lesser role if at all. Bocheński 
defines totalitarianism as “a doctrine according to which all 
fields should have a deontic authority”, and “expands a deontic 
authority over everything” (Bocheński 1974). If the epistemic 
authority is negotiated and gained by equal partners (or who 
have equal rights) throughout the knowledge assumption 
process, the deontic authority is “given” and imposed by the 
most powerful to the weakest ones during the assumption of 
values, norms, and directives in order to ensure the compliance 
with the desired social order. While the educational system is 
dominated by the deontic authority, the knowledge process is 
subordinated to the one that aims to maintain the social order 
and to shape conformist attitudes. The epistemic authority of 
teachers is used to cover the real intentions of the system. A 
student is more open to follow the advice to comply with, and to 
adhere to a system of values when it comes from a person who 
is an authority that he/she respects, even if this is a deontic 
authority. This is why totalitarian regimes paid a special 
attention to schools and teachers whom they wanted to adhere 
to their cause in order to further accept to transfer their 
authority to the system,  which is  to change the epistemic 
authority into a deontic one.  
The indoctrination has fundamentally changed the 
cognitive framework. The truth is not excluded but it loses its 
reference points and criteria being then reinterpreted from the 
viewpoint of the “valid” doctrine. No action of indoctrination is 
admitted de facto by the one who applies it. The indoctrination 
is often defined as the “doctrine of the opponent”, meaning that 
it is sufficient to identify the “real” and “valid” doctrine in order META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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to consider any speech opposing to it as an indoctrinating 
speech. The communist speech abounds in criticisms of the 
capitalist system whose subject is the practice of indoctrination. 
Under these circumstances, it is recommended to identify 
criteria that allow the determination of the most relevant cases 
of indoctrination and to understand the “mechanisms” 
triggering the transformation of teaching into indoctrination. 
 
3. Situations and Types of Indoctrination in Teaching 
 
O. Reboul presents 13 standard situations of teaching-
related indoctrination (1977, 14-24): 
1.  to teach harmful doctrines. For example, we 
indoctrinate children when we teach them that people 
belonging to a specific race are dull, thieves, evil etc. these 
being the specific features of their race; by doing so, we are not 
simply inculcating them with untrue notions, but also with 
racial or ethnic hatred; 
2.  to use the education to support a partisan 
doctrine. This form of indoctrination means to advocate for a 
biased doctrine in a place not intended for such purposes: the 
school. Teachers use their authority to teach bias doctrines;  
3.  to learn without understanding the essence. In 
this case, it is not the contents of a doctrine that really matters 
but how the inculcation takes place. Here, indoctrination means 
to learn without understanding rationally what is being taught. 
The major risk is that we might get used to acquire ideas 
without arguing them, which leads to manipulation; 
4.  to make use of “authority” in teaching. This form 
of indoctrination is related to the fact that the subjects cannot 
determine the truth by themselves, and this becomes debatable. 
Similar to other fields, the authority is a requisite for 
knowledge. An essential requirement of the progress of science 
is to have confidence in the scientific competences of specific 
“authorities”. The issue of indoctrination occurs when the 
authority is no longer proposed but imposed; it uses both 
seduction and constraints; 
5.  to teach starting from preconceptions. An 
education system relying on racial, religious preconceptions or Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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of any other nature is definitely tendentious. In this case, the 
indoctrination is more focused on contents rather than form;  
6.  to teach starting from a doctrine considered to be 
unique. This is no longer about preconceptions because the 
teacher might be fully aware of the doctrine and the 
“explanatory model” inspiring it; the parti pris is on purpose. 
The teacher uses the indoctrination when, by adopting an 
explanatory model, he/she rejects all others a priori; 
7.  to teach something as scientific when in reality it 
is not. This is the case when a doctrine is abusively using the 
title of science. This was the case of scientific socialism, and 
even scientific racism. This abusive scientification is in fact the 
modern form of dogmatism. We indoctrinate others when we 
teach dogmas, and assign an objective value to personal or 
collective beliefs; 
8.  to teach only the positive aspects of a doctrine. 
This indoctrination is no longer related to learning premises 
but its effects: this form of education excludes all its opponent 
facts,  
9.  to counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a 
certain doctrine. In this case, the education is not only 
tendentious but also false. The one who indoctrinates invents 
the facts, counterfeits the statistics, provides false evidence etc; 
10.  to arbitrarily select parts of a curriculum. A 
curriculum is always arbitrary because it involves selections, 
and, implicitly, rejections. The indoctrination starts when the 
pedagogical selection gains an explicit ideological meaning; 
11.  to emphasize a specific value during the 
educational process while disfavoring others. This 
indoctrination is significantly driven by emotions. In its 
essence, the excitement is not indoctrination; the latter occurs 
in the Manicheist education that emphasizes the virtues of a 
system and denigrates the rest of them; 
12.  to inculcate hatred through education. This is the 
serious form of the aforementioned situation, being 
characteristic to fanatics; 
13.    to impose a belief using violence. This is an extreme 
situation because the violence is explicitly visible while the 
indoctrination involves dissimulation. The direct violence 
rather generates lack of confidence. It is much easier to repress META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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a critical reasoning using the indirect violence: censure, 
blackmail, seduction etc. Such examples can be found in 
publicity and propaganda 
Based on the forms identified by Reboul, we can 
establish two fundamental categories of indoctrination 
situations: 
  situations of indoctrination asserted through their 
prevalent pedagogical meaning: to learn without understanding 
the essence, to make use of “authority” in teaching, to teach 
starting from preconceptions, to teach something as scientific 
when in reality it is nothing but a simple opinion or unchecked 
belief, to teach starting from a doctrine considered to be unique, 
to emphasize a specific value during the educational process 
while disfavoring others etc.; 
  situations of indoctrination asserted through their 
prevalent ideological and political meaning: to use the 
education to support a partisan doctrine; to teach only the 
positive aspects of a doctrine, to counterfeit the facts in order to 
emphasize a certain doctrine; to inculcate, through education, 
the hatred against everything opposing to a specific doctrine 
etc. 
Reboul also found two additional methods or types of 
indoctrination (1977, 12): the sectary indoctrination acting upon 
our deepest preconceptions in order to replace them and the 
conformist indoctrination that actually relies on our deepest 
preconceptions in order to strengthen them. We notice that the 
first type occurs independently from our previous existential 
order, being specific to situations like revolutions that aim to 
radically change the social and political order based on an 
imposed and deep change of mentality. The sectary 
indoctrination is related to the establishment of totalitarian 
regimes. This form of indoctrination is grounded on physical, 
but most of all, psychological violence. Brainwashing is an 
extreme but particularly relevant situation. The conformist 
indoctrination relies on the existing mentality and enhances 
the incoherence, preconceptions and confusion in order to 
inculcate with new values and attitudes. Unlike the first type, 
the conformist indoctrination is almost invisible, non-violent 
and reaches its targets after a longer time, with almost the Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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same efficiency. It does not oppose the formal educational 
system but integrates into and uses it to achieve its purposes. 
The sectary indoctrination has to face the reluctance of those 
envisaged, but when it materializes in the change of the 
political system it starts aiming to ensure the compliance of 
individuals with the new values of the regime and continues 
with the conformist indoctrination.  
None of the types, forms or situations of indoctrination 
can be separated from the educational system. A situation 
taken out of the educational context cannot be accused of 
indoctrination. For example, the counterfeit of facts may 
represent a moral or legal situation, but not indoctrination if it 
does not involve the teaching–learning relationship, where the 
indoctrinating teacher changes, adjusts and interprets the facts 
to make the learning student consider them inseparable from 
the values of a doctrine. The indoctrinating individual will 
never admit the real intentions, but will use the formal aspect 
of his/her teaching/training activity: he/she teaches, trains 
people, he/she does not indoctrinate them. Even when the 
educational system is totally subordinated to a political 
ideology and states its intention to radically change the didactic 
process and the training of individuals in order to make them 
obedient to the new political regime, the indoctrination 
intention is still hidden: the opponent is always the one who 
indoctrinates. The acquiring of new values and attitudes is not 
an (declared) action of indoctrination, but has the role to 
“prepare” the young individual to “defend” himself and “fight” 
the enemy who is the enemy of the new political regime. This 
intention hides behind a necessity built according to the new 
axiological order. 
 
4. Teaching as Indoctrination. 
Indoctrination Criteria in Education 
 
When does teaching become indoctrination? 
 
By summarizing the analysis and criteria justifying the 
approaches in this field, we propose a four-dimensional 
explanatory model. The analysis of the indoctrination through META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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teaching must consider four fundamental elements: intention, 
teaching contents, teaching method(s) and finalities of the 
didactic process. Further on, we propose a brief analysis of the 
meaning, functions and practice of indoctrination starting from 
each dimension. 
 
Indoctrination as intention 
 
According to White (1972) and Snook (1972), the key 
element is the intention. Their arguments use the following 
ideas:  
  There is no indoctrination in the absence of an 
indoctrinating person, and what makes human actions unique 
is the intention itself. 
  The existence of authoritarian methods is not a sign 
of indoctrination if they do not intend to prevent the child from 
thinking by himself and are not used for this purpose. In fact, 
what really matters is the purpose they are intended for and 
not their simple use. 
  The result of indoctrination cannot represent a 
criterion because the indoctrination is not always successful, as 
the teaching process is not always successful. Indeed, we cannot 
identify the indoctrination based only on its results, 
particularly when one of these results is the reduction, until 
disappearance, of the ability to perceive the process in its 
essence. On the other hand, the indoctrination with no results 
is not genuine, as no teaching process is successful if nothing is 
being learned. The indoctrination itself remains an intention in 
this situation and does not become reality, at least not a 
dangerous one. 
If only the intention matters, then no teacher can be 
accused of indoctrination if he/she manages to make students 
adhere to a doctrine by using an attractive style and persuasion 
and no hidden intentions. Similarly, a teacher who teaches a 
dangerous or false doctrine in which he/she really believes 
cannot be considered as indoctrinating. It is obvious that such 
situations are debatable and draw attention to the fact that the 
identification and qualification of intentions is not always 
possible. Therefore, although the intention is essential for Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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understanding a situation of indoctrination, this cannot 
constitute the single functional criterion. 
 
Indoctrination through contents 
 
Teaching turns into indoctrination when it encourages 
the transfer of contents subordinated to a political, religious 
ideology or of any other nature. The most relevant examples of 
indoctrination in this regard are those asserted by their 
ideological meaning: to use the education to support a partisan 
doctrine; to teach only the positive aspects of a doctrine, to 
counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a certain doctrine, to 
inculcate, through education, the hatred against everything 
that opposes to the imposed doctrine etc. A criterion used for 
separating the indoctrinating from the non-indoctrinating 
contents is the difference between science (the explicit meaning 
of the word) and belief. We deal with teaching when the teacher 
convinces the students of what he/she knows  and with 
indoctrination when he/she convinces or attempts to convince 
the students of what he/she believes. A sincere intention counts 
less; the contents of teaching: knowledge or belief is what really 
counts most (Reboul 1977, 55). On the other hand, any form of 
knowledge, including the scientific one, relies on several options 
that are not specifically scientific, but rather constitute the 
expression of the mentality of an era or society. Whether they 
provide or not ethics or religion classes, all educational systems 
are influenced by the beliefs and preconceptions of those 
entitled to make decisions and selections on behalf of the direct 
beneficiaries of the system. Good education does not hide the 
ideology, but places it in the field of knowledge, thus depriving 
it of its greatest power, namely dissimulation (Reboul 1977, 63). 
If we accept this idea, we must also admit that it is not the 
doctrine that leads to indoctrination, but the way we relate to 
the doctrine, and not the contents taught but the teaching 
method that generates a situation of indoctrination. 
 
Indoctrination as a method 
 
Teaching may become an indoctrination act when it uses 
authoritarian methods, regardless of the contents type and the 
intentions of the teacher. Defining indoctrination depending on META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
98 
 
the method used allows us to talk about indoctrination without 
considering any doctrine. This is not about a selection of 
vulnerable content or predisposed to indoctrination. Teaching 
mathematics may provide a clear example of indoctrination, if 
this is made in a coercive and authoritarian way. Rejecting the 
authoritarian education was one of the common points of all the 
“new education” trend options. This idea is present in the work 
of J.-J. Rousseau, the setter of this trend, to whom the right 
education is natural, non-coercive and respectful towards the 
child’s liberty. Rousseau considers that the bookish type of 
education slows down the child’s thinking. Therefore, to educate 
means to provide the child with the liberty to live his/her own 
life experiences. Hence a serious psychological argument in 
favor of the thesis on the indoctrination as a method: the 
coercive education is against the child’s nature. Non-directivism 
represented the most severe answer to the authority of school 
and educators. Beyond all exaggerations, this orientation 
expressed the importance of the real changes needed in the 
concept of education, and also specified the direction of the 
changes to be made. Its value lies in the fact that it brought to 
the fore the issue of the teacher-student relation and the need 
to transform it into real communication, the frequent conflicts 
between the teacher’s authority and the student’s need for 
freedom, the need to educate independent human beings in 
schools, with the conscience of liberty and responsibility. The 
authoritarianism of the didactic relation and the use of 
methodological strategies based on constraint are constantly 
associated with the denial of the freedom of expression and 
conscience, which is the very essence of the indoctrination by 
education. Dewey considered that the authoritarian education 
is equal to indoctrination, arguing that the authority is 
contrary to the democratic ideal. Defining the indoctrination as 
a method results in the ample extension of the meaning of this 
term, although it keeps us in the area of negative semantics. 
The indoctrination act is no longer necessarily connected to a 
specific content. The science teacher may indoctrinate, from a 
formal viewpoint at least, to the extent that the arts teacher 
can do. Moreover, indoctrination does not take into account the 
presence of intention; a teacher may accidentally indoctrinate Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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or without being  aware of this, if he/she uses passive and 
authoritarian methods and does not accept but his/her own 
ideas as valid. Thus indoctrination becomes a matter of “style” 
rather than a certain doctrine. The main limitation of this 
approach is related to a very simple truth: the use of a coercive 
strategy determines rejection rather than adhesion to an idea, 
just as the use of a democratic strategy does not involve the 
dissimulation of intention and manipulation. Therefore, 
indoctrination does not always depend on the authoritarian 
style and cannot be dissociated by values and attitudes, and 
thus by the contents that confer a sense for the didactic act. 
There are several critical differences between finality and 
intention: 
  - intention can be attributed to an individual, finality is 
expressed at the system level; 
 - intention is part of an explanatory mechanism of a singular 
act, while finality determines the evolution of a process, by 
integrating acts into a coherent system; 
  - intention mostly acts in the beginning phase of an action, 
while the finality accompanies an action throughout its 
trajectory, right to the end (from this viewpoint, the term itself 
is suggestive), allowing the correlation between the results and 
the expectations. 
Gaston Mialaret (1991, 53) identifies two basic concepts 
of educational finality: 
- a vision on man: as an individual, as social being and in his 
relations with nature and environment; 
- a vision on education’s functions:  
- Is education only for the benefit of the individuals? 
- Is it in the service of a group, either political or religious, etc. 
or of the society, in general? What determines this 
subordination of education?  
 - Is it in the service of society? But what kind of society: the 
present one, the future one? What will be the future society 
like: an extension of the present one; a completely new society? 
 
Mialaret expresses the nature of the finality in an 
interrogative way, using a set of questions whose answer 
depends on the sense of the educational act. Such an approach META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
100 
 
allows us to know the values that ground an educational 
system. The finality of education provides the most important 
criterion for the selection and organization of the educational 
content and for the design of teaching and learning strategies. 
The finality is the expression of the educational project of a 
society. These define the desirable personality profile of a 
society, in a given historical time. The “new man” ideal forms 
the grounds of the educational project of the communist society, 
producing radical changes at the level of content and teaching 
strategies. The communist ideology confers upon the school a 
critical role in transforming the society, by transforming the 
education into a political indoctrination process. 
 
5. Criticism of Indoctrination and  
the Constructivist Approach in Education 
 
Can indoctrination be prevented?  
Where is the limit between normality and deviance and 
how can we be more cautious towards them? 
 
The change of perspective on knowledge and on the 
teacher-student relation in the teaching context may lead to the 
prevention of the abusive effects of the education induced 
indoctrination. The constructivist paradigm provides a critical 
perspective on the indoctrination through the conception on 
knowledge and its achievement during the didactic process. We 
further present several ideas that draft a critical approach of 
indoctrination, from the constructivist model perspective. 
1.  Knowledge is both a process and the product of 
this process. Knowledge does not totally pre-exist, but it is built 
by the active and critical involvement of some subjects, having 
expectations and motivations that implicitly influence the 
cognitive interpretation of the world. The involvement of the 
student exceeds the area of assuming some previously produced 
knowledge.  
2.  The conflict of ideas enhances the knowledge 
build-up. The concept of cognitive conflict was proposed by B. 
Inhelder, a collaborator of Piaget, to emphasize that the 
progress in knowledge is not a linear and cumulative process, Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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but it involves the child in cognitive unbalanced situations, and 
puts him/her in front of experiences that determine internal 
conflicts, that make the child aware of his/her own acquisitions. 
Knowledge is built during the process of conflictive 
confrontation between the individual and the environment. 
Confrontation generates adaptive unbalances that challenge 
the individual to use all his/her adaptation resources in order to 
reach a more stable balance. The situation of a cognitive 
unbalance in relation to a new problem that cannot be solved by 
using the previously acquired procedures and knowledge 
becomes a potential factor of cognitive progress. 
3.  The teacher enhances the previous acquisitions of 
the student. Most of the constructivist didactics are based on 
the previous conception notion, which was shaped for the first 
time by Bachelard. He brings into discussion the previous 
culture of the student as an epistemological obstacle for 
knowledge. He supports the idea of a total separation and of the 
ongoing conflict between the common, empirical knowledge and 
the scientific one and he is vexed by the fact that “...teachers 
failed to reflect on the fact that the student comes to the classes 
(...) with already existing empirical knowledge: therefore, the 
problem is not to acquire an experimental culture, but to 
change the culture, to remove the barriers already formed in 
the daily life” (1938, 18). Knowledge building is not a simple 
and linear process, but it often involves a preliminary 
“deconstructive” stage, to remove the biases or the false ideas 
that act as an obstacle to the knowledge process. In other 
approaches (Giordan and Vecchi 1987; Giordan 1993; Giordan 
1998; Larochelle and Desautels 1992), “the preliminary 
conceptions” play an active or even positive role, and knowledge 
is conceived both as an extension of the previously acquired 
data, and as a separation from them. 
4.  Errors may play a positive role in learning. 
Giving a new value to errors is determined by a different 
perspective on knowledge, which is not given, as a perfect 
conceptual system, already made, which has to be assimilated 
by the student as it is, but a process in which the student is 
actively involved, by building his/her own cognitive system. 
Therefore, the resizing of the error condition depends on the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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change of our way to report ourselves to knowledge. Favre 
(1995) talks about the replacement of “the paradigm of 
dogmatic approach of information”, based on certitudes that can 
take the shape of dogmatic statements and abusive 
generalizations with “the paradigm of scientific approach of 
information”, that works with provisional and approximate 
assumptions. If “the paradigm of dogmatic approach of 
information” is valid for closed societies, where individuals 
must know only what they are transmitted to, in a normative 
educational process, “the paradigm of scientific approach of 
information” is specific to the society whose major values are: 
change, progress and personal assertion (Favre 1995, 212). 
5.  The confrontation at the ideas level does not 
exclude cooperation. On the contrary, the idea of social 
construction of knowledge lead to the revalorization of 
pedagogic relations at the teaching level (student-student and 
teacher-student). A.-N. Perret-Clermont considers that the 
change of educational relations not only leads to the 
improvement of the social and affective climate of the 
classroom, but it also makes the learning more efficient (2000, 
31). The direct pedagogical consequence of this observation is 
the design of educational strategies based on team work and 
cooperation. According to M. Perraudeau, the most original 
element of the constructivist approach and, paradoxically, the 
less known one, is the design of knowledge environment not 
only in a physical sense, but mostly as a human environment 
(2000, 80), and therefore, an increased importance granted to 
the cooperation-based activities. 
6.  The adult’s role is to mediate the interaction of the 
child with the environment, but not by reducing or attenuating 
the problems faced by the child, as a cognitive subject, but, on 
the contrary, by involving the children in activities that create 
cognitive conflicts, into an active solution seeking process. One 
of the most important qualities of the educator is from this 
perspective that of anticipating the competences the child will 
be capable of. The way in which this is done may not be the 
traditional one, by transmitting some content, because these 
competences cannot be regarded as knowledge “to be taught”, Mariana Momanu / The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination 
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but under the shape of the individual capacity to build and 
continuously rebuild his/her own cognitive system. 
7.  Knowledge is a democratic process where each 
candidate to the cognitive act expresses his/her opinions and 
confronts them with the others. The student thus understands 
the importance of ideas diversity and learns how to 
defend/argument his/her own opinions. In this context, “the 
previous conception” of the student changes its condition: it 
turns from a simple statement into an assumption, which will 
be checked in various ways, depending on the cognitive act 
specificity: the conformity to the reality, the logical coherence, 
etc.  
Without necessarily being a recipe, constructivism is an option 
for the cultivation of the critical spirit and in order to prevent 
the risks of indoctrination by teaching. Dethroning the absolute 
truth dogma leads to a pluralistic concept of knowledge that is 
grounded on the moral of mutual acceptance and respect, that 
positively enhances the tensions resulting from diversities and 
difference. “Even when new contents of learning should be 
connectable, they have to differ from the alredy existing 
knowledge. Adapting everything to existing cognitive systems 
means being resistant to learning. Perceiving only 
confirmations and no differences means stagnation. The 
acceptance and testing of new distinctions and leading 
differences present a qualitative ‘jump’ in a learning 
biography.” (Siebert 2002, 117) The constructivist approach 
answers to the exigencies of a democratic and multicultural 
society by the cultivation of ideas, in order to form in schools 
autonomous persons, aware of their liberty and responsibility. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
The text includes excerpts from Mariana Momanu's book entitled Educație și 
ideologie. O analiză pedagogică a sistemului totalitar comunist  (Education 
and Ideology. A Pedagogical Analysis of the Totalitarian Communist System), 
Sub-chapter II. 2, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Publishing House of Iasi. 
These were reviewed and adjusted to the current context of this analysis.   
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